

Best practices: Step by step instructions to configure a secure database system

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Agenda

- Learn the best practices:
 - Required for OS configuration to ensure a secure Db2 setup
 - Authenticating users to Db2
 - Controlling what data users have access to through various authorization features of Db2
 - Encrypting both data at rest and data in motion
 - Tracking database activity using audit

Our Goals

- Practical advice for a novice or intermediate database administrator to setup an initially secure Db2 server
- Focus on the “biggest bang for the buck” items
- Best practices listed are intended as a starting point
 - Advanced setups may differ from those listed here

System setup details

- To limit our talk to 1 hour, we will make some simplifying assumptions
- Single server version of Db2
 - not DPF or pureScale
- RHEL 7

Learn the best practices required for OS configuration to ensure a secure Db2 setup.

The server for Db2

- Use a dedicated server for Db2
 - Files like db2diag.log are world readable
 - Want strong control over who can log into the server, only administrators
 - Historically we've had more security vulnerabilities that can only be exploited by users who can log into the OS than those that can be exploited remotely
- Don't change Db2 installed file permissions
 - This can often lead to unexpected behaviour
- Only instance owner needs access to database path and transaction logs

Configure LDAP authentication

- Make sure necessary packages are installed

```
yum install -y openldap-clients sssd authconfig sssd-client
```

- Enable SSSD and LDAP

```
authconfig --enableshadow --passalgo=sha512 --enablesssd --enablesssdauth --  
enableldap --enableldapauth --enableldaptls --ldapserver="<hostname>" --  
ldapbasedn="<basedn, o=...>" --update
```

- Download your Root CA cert for the LDAP server

- Add to '/etc/openldap/cacerts/'

- Restart SSSD

```
systemctl restart sssd.service
```

Control Who Can Login to the server

- Make a copy of the pam file for later use (before it gets changed)
`cp /etc/pam.d/system-auth /etc/pam.d/db2`
- Modify `/etc/security/access.conf`
 - + : root wheel : ALL
 - + : db2inst1 : ALL
 - : ALL : ALL
- Modify `/etc/sysconfig/authconfig`
 - Change the following line to yes
`USEPAMACCESS=yes`
- Run ``authconfig --updateall``

Create instance accounts

- Have root create instance owner and fenced mode user

```
groupadd db2iadm1
```

```
groupadd db2fsdm1
```

```
useradd -g db2iadm1 db2inst1
```

```
useradd -g db2fsdm1 db2fenc1
```

```
passwd db2inst1
```

```
passwd db2fenc1
```

- These names are common, but not required
 - Limited to 8 characters, not many special characters supported

Install Db2

- Perform a typical/default install of Db2 as root
`./db2_install -p SERVER`
- Create instance
`./db2icrt -s ese -u db2fenc1 db2inst1`

Add database users to OS if not using LDAP

- `useradd <username>`
- `passwd <username>`

- Do not add these users to `access.conf`, you don't want them logging into the OS

Where to go next with OS setup

- Firewalls
 - Typically only need the port used for TLS (SSL_SVCENAME) open, plus SSH
- Other typical server hardening

Learn the best practices for securely authenticating users to Db2

Authentication Types

- Authentication is the act of checking your proof of identity
 - Abbreviation AUTHN
- The AUTHENTICATION parameter in the Database Manager Configuration determines which security mechanism Db2 uses for authentication
- Users are always defined externally to Db2

Example authentication types:

- SERVER_ENCRYPT
- SERVER
- DATA_ENCRYPT
- KERBEROS
- GSSPLUGIN
- TOKEN_SERVER_ENCRYPT

Example user definition locations

- Operating System
- LDAP
- Kerberos
- Plugin
- Identity Provider Token

Best Practice - Use SERVER_ENCRYPT

- Use SERVER_ENCRYPT
 - Encrypts usernames and passwords sent during connect
 - Supports local users or LDAP
- Do **NOT** use CLIENT
 - Anyone with a network connection can impersonate any other user
- Do **NOT** use DATA_ENCRYPT
 - Deprecated, only supports DES encryption
 - Use TLS instead

Using SERVER_ENCRYPT securely

- Default is DES encryption, but we really want AES
 - set ALTERNATE_AUTH_ENC to AES_ONLY in DBM CFG
- For historical compatibility reasons, SERVER_ENCRYPT does not enforce encryption for JDBC connections
 - You can force its use
 - db2set DB2AUTH=JCC_ENFORCE_SECMEC
 - Or log its abuse
 - db2set DB2AUTH=JCC_NOENFORCE_SECMEC_MSG

Transparent LDAP

- The most popular authentication method used is SERVER_ENCRYPT with Transparent LDAP enabled
 - db2set DB2AUTH=OSAUTHDB
 - Db2 makes OS calls via PAM APIs (Linux), OS in turn looks locally or in LDAP
 - LDAP usage is transparent to Db2 as it is handled by OS
 - Even if not using transparent LDAP right now, you can still ‘future-proof’ your instance by changing this now
- LDAP plugins require ALL users to be defined at LDAP server
 - Many customers want instance owner and FMP user defined locally

Transparent LDAP Configuration (1/2)

- Db2 requires its own PAM configuration file in `/etc/pam.d/db2`
- In a previous step we made a copy of the system PAM configuration
 - We do not want the rule that limits access in the Db2 config, otherwise users will not be able to login unless they can log into the OS
 - Make sure this line is not present:
 - account required [pam_access.so](#)

Authentication Cache

- New feature in Db2 11.5.3.0
- Improve performance for slow authentication and group lookup
- Db2 maintains cache of
 - Hashed password
 - Group membership
- Configured at database level
 - AUTHN_CACHE_USERS
 - How many users are in the cache (controls how much memory is used)
 - AUTHN_CACHE_DURATION
 - How long a cached entry is valid for
 - Expired entries will force authentication next time the user connects

Where to go next with authentication

- Advanced Authentication Types
 - Kerberos
 - Single Sign-on support
 - JWT
 - Token authentication when integrating with an identify provider and web application
 - LDAP Plugins
 - Db2 makes LDAP API calls directly to an LDAP server
 - Custom GSSAPI plugins
 - You can create your own authentication code (in-depth C programming required)
- SRVCON_AUTH
 - Separate local authorization from incoming connect authentication

Learn the best practices for controlling what data users have access to through various authorization features of Db2

Authorization - terminology

- Authorization is the go/no go decision of whether an action can take place
 - Abbreviation AUTHZ
- Authorities are collections of permissions centered around a related topic
 - Ex. SYSADM, DBADM, SECADM
- Privileges are individual permissions on specific objects
 - SELECT on a TABLE T1

Summary of authorities

- Authorities are hierarchical, allowing delegation of common tasks
- SYSADM → SYSCTRL → SYSMANT → SYSMON
- SECADM → ACCESSCTRL
- DATAACCESS
- DBADM → SQLADM → EXPLAIN
→ WLMADM

Which authorities to use

- There are a lot of authorities - should you use them all?
 - The more they are held by distinct users the better, but given our goal of a practical setup for smaller cases, then no, don't try to use them all
- Database creator gets SECADM, ACCESSCTRL, DATAACCESS, DBADM
- First separation is to focus on is having SECADM and DBADM held by different users
 - Numerous advanced security functions are only usable by SECADM
- Secondly, eliminate the use of DATAACCESS
 - Watch out, DATAACCESS is granted by default with DBADM
 - Be explicit in all the permissions you grant

Authority Configuration

- These recommendations leave us with two distinct administrators
 - Database Administrator
 - SYSADM
 - DBADM
 - ACCESSCTRL (to handle day to day grants/revokes)
 - Security Administrator
 - SECADM - advanced security functionality and auditing of Db admins
- The database creator has had DATAACCESS revoked by SECADM

Numerous privileges are granted to PUBLIC during create database

- There's a few that should be removed
 - CONNECT
 - Normally Db2 can authenticate a wider range of users than should be connecting to your database - for example everyone in your LDAP server
 - IMPLICIT SCHEMA
 - Implicit schemas (no CREATE SCHEMA statement) are owned by the system and PUBLIC can create objects in it
 - Users should be explicitly creating schemas (DBADM has implicit IMPLICIT_SCHEMA)
 - CREATETAB
 - Most users have no need to create tables, this should be a controlled activity
 - BINDADD
 - Most users have no need to create packages

Several privileges to make sure you do not grant to PUBLIC

- A few privileges may not be so obvious to strongly restricted:
- **CREATE_EXTERNAL_ROUTINE**
 - The ability to create C and Java routines that are run at the server
 - Given the broad capabilities of C/Java code, these must be restricted
- **CREATE_NOT_FENCED_ROUTINE**
 - Not fenced (aka trusted) routines run outside the Fenced Mode Process (FMP) sandbox and instead directly inside the Db2 server
 - It's very easy for these routines to crash or corrupt the Db2 server when written in C or Java

Views for authorization delegation

- Views can be used to control what data users see
- A user can be granted SELECT on the view without having access to the underlying base table(s) and other objects
 - View definer needs the access, but not the view user
 - SECADM and ACCESSCTRL can grant the SELECT
 - View DEFINER is given CONTROL, which includes the ability to GRANT on the view, if they had CONTROL on the base table(s) or DBADM/DATAACCESS
- Users with DATAACCESS can always select directly from the base table, so a view will not protect against these users
 - Otherwise views present a useful security mechanism

Routines for authorization delegation

- Routines can modify and return data to the callers
- A user can be granted EXECUTE on a routine without having access to the underlying tables and other objects
 - Routine definer needs the access, but not the routine caller
 - For SQL routines. Dynamic and non-SQL routines are more complex
 - Routine definer given EXECUTE WITH GRANT
 - SECADM and ACCESSCTRL can also grant EXECUTE
- Allows you to encapsulate business logic into the routine and control access at the routine level

Using roles and groups to ease authorization maintenance

- An application user may require access to dozens or more objects
- If you can define your users according to their job, you can grant privileges and authorities to roles or groups representing those jobs
- Grant the user membership in the appropriate role or group
- If a user changes jobs, it's simple to remove them from the role or group instead of individual objects

Groups vs Roles (1/3)

- For certain objects, Db2 records a dependency of the owner's privilege to access dependent objects
 - Ex. a user having SELECT on a TABLE to create a VIEW
- The user must maintain those privileges
- If the user loses those privileges, the objects will be marked as invalid or inoperative
 - Losing SELECT on the TABLE will make the VIEW inoperative
- Special case for users who hold DATAACCESS when the object is created
 - Dependency is not recorded

Affected Objects:

- Views
- Materialized Query Tables (MQTs)
- SQL routines
- Triggers
- Packages containing static SQL

Groups vs Roles (2/3)

- For creation of listed objects, Db2 does not consider privileges obtained through groups
 - Db2 is not immediately aware of group changes in order to invalidate objects
- Roles alleviate this problem, Db2 **will** consider privileges from roles for these cases
 - Except for roles obtained through groups

Groups vs Roles (3/3)

- Using LDAP for groups?
 - If possible, use roles for administrators who will be creating objects
 - Otherwise you must grant privileges to individual users for object creation
 - Use groups for application users
- No LDAP
 - Use roles for any in-database privileges
 - Still need groups for SYS* authorities at the instance level

Validate a user's authorities

- SYSPROC.AUTH_LIST_AUTHORITIES_FOR_AUTHID table function
 - List the instance and database authorities held by a user
 - Shows if they are direct, through a group or role

```
SELECT * FROM TABLE (SYSPROC.AUTH_LIST_AUTHORITIES_FOR_AUTHID ('MYUSER', 'U') ) AS T
```

AUTHORITY	D_USER	D_GROUP	D_PUBLIC	ROLE_USER	ROLE_GROUP	ROLE_PUBLIC	D_ROLE
ACCESSCTRL	N	N	N	N	N	N	*
CONNECT	N	N	Y	N	N	N	*
DATAACCESS	N	N	N	N	N	N	*
DBADM	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	*
SECADM	Y	N	N	N	N	N	*
SYSADM	*	Y	*	*	*	*	*
...							

Check what database authorities have been granted

- The SQL in the speaker notes will show database authorities that are held by:
 - Users, groups, roles, PUBLIC
 - Also via nested roles: ex. DBADM granted to role1 granted to use U3

AUTHORITY	GRANTEE	GRANTEETYPE	VIA	VIATYPE
DBADM	U1	U	-	-
DBADM	G1	G	-	-
DBADM	R1	R	-	-
DBADM	U3	U	R1	R

Check what privileges have been granted

- The view SYSIBMADM.PRIVILEGES is a summary of all the privileges stored in the catalog tables (it's a big UNION ALL statement)

```
SELECT AUTHID, PRIVILEGE, OBJECTNAME, OBJECTSCHEMA, OBJECTTYPE  
FROM SYSIBMADM.PRIVILEGES
```

AUTHID	PRIVILEGE	OBJECTNAME	OBJECTSCHEMA	OBJECTTYPE
.....	-----	-----	-----	-----
...-				
GSTAGER	CONTROL	EMPLOYEE	GSTAGER	TABLE
GSTAGER	ALTER	EMPLOYEE	GSTAGER	TABLE
GSTAGER	DELETE	EMPLOYEE	GSTAGER	TABLE
GSTAGER	INSERT	EMPLOYEE	GSTAGER	TABLE
GSTAGER	SELECT	EMPLOYEE	GSTAGER	TABLE
GSTAGER	UPDATE	EMPLOYEE	GSTAGER	TABLE

Look at individual catalog views for targeted details

Some common SYSCAT views

- DBAUTH
- TABAUTH
- SCHEMAAUTH
- ROUTINEAUTH
- <OBJ>AUTH

Where to go next with authorization

- CREATE DATABASE RESTRICTIVE
 - Eliminates all grants to PUBLIC at create db time and in the future
 - Due to Db2's use of packages for SQL execution from CLP, CLI etc, a difficult task to initially get setup
- Separation of Duties
 - Ideal goal is the user who grants authorities is different than those who can access data
 - Different user for SECADM, ACCESSCTRL, DBADM etc.

Where to go next continued

- Row and Column Access Control
 - Column masking and row permissions
 - Custom SQL rules to control what users have access to
- Label Based Access Control (LBAC)
 - Complicated access control rules based on labels
 - RCAC is much more user friendly
- Trusted Context
 - Rules that define a trusted connection, which allows
 - Dynamic access to a role only within that connection
 - Ability to switch to other users (for middle tier applications to preserve end user identity)

Learn the best practices for encrypting both data at rest and data in motion

TLS - Transport Layer Security (1/3)

- TLS provides encryption of data in motion, over the network
 - Any references to SSL are synonyms for TLS
- Configure it in place of TCPIP for client-server communication
 - Don't forget to use it for HADR as well!

TLS - Transport Layer Security (2/3)

- Unfortunately, the default version of TLS that Db2 uses is TLS 1.0 and 1.1, which are insecure with known vulnerabilities
- You must configure the use of TLS 1.2
- set `SSL_VERSIONS` to `TLSV12` in `dbm cfg`

TLS - Transport Layer Security (3/3)

- Make sure keystore files are secure at client and server
 - Access to private key at server could allow someone to masquerade as server
 - Access to keystore file at client could allow accepting rogue CA signed certificates (fake servers)
- File should only be readable/writeable by:
 - Server - the instance owner
 - Client - the application
 - These are the defaults, don't change them

Native Encryption (1/3)

- Db2 Native Encryption provides built in, application transparent encryption of data at rest (on disk) for:
 - Database container files
 - Transaction Logs
 - Backup files
- Protects against *offline* attacks against data
 - accessing the data outside of the database manager

Native Encryption (2/3)

- Enabling native encryption is very easy
 - ENCRYPT keyword on CREATE DATABASE or RESTORE
- Key management is difficult
 - Administrative challenge to manage keys
 - Keys must be backed up, maintained for long periods
 - You can end up with numerous keys
 - Each database should have its own key, they can also be rotated
- Enable native encryption if you can manage the administration
 - Failure can mean complete loss of data if un-backed up keys are lost

Native Encryption (3/3)

- Similar to TLS, you need to ensure keystores are protected
 - Only the instance owner should have read/write access
- Make sure your keystores are backed up!!!
 - Also make sure you know the password to open those keystores

Where to go next with native encryption

- Switch from keystore files to centralized key managers
 - KMIP servers are most popular
 - Similar to LDAP server for keys
 - Hardware Security Modules provide ultimate in key security
 - Often more difficult to setup and use
 - Provide central management of keys, backup, access control etc.
- Investigate how keys are different for databases and backups
 - Default is the use the same key, but they can be different
 - Useful if you want to restore the database somewhere, but don't want to expose the live key for the database (test system etc).
 - You can also encrypt one or the other (default is both)

**Learn the best practices for tracking database activity using
audit**

- Db2 has a built-in audit facility that allows you to track actions within the database
- Two levels of configuration are provided to fine tune what is audited

Categories

- AUDIT - use of audit facility
- CHECKING - authorization checks
- SECMAINT - grants/revokes
- OBJMAINT - object creation/deletion (some alters)
- CONTEXT - contextual information for other events
- EXECUTE - SQL statement execution
- SYSADMIN - SYS* actions
- VALIDATE - authentication checks


Objects to Audit

- Database
- Users/Groups/Roles
- Authorities
- Tables
- Trusted Contexts

Impact of Audit

- Auditing *everything* can have a substantial impact to performance on a busy OLTP system
 - AUDIT_BUF_SZ in the dbm cfg can be configured to allow buffered writes of audit events drastically improving performance
- The amount of data generated by auditing *everything* can be overwhelming on a busy OLTP system
 - Gigabytes per minute
- Audit only what you need

Which categories to audit



- EXECUTE
 - CONTEXT
 - CHECKING
 - VALIDATE
 - SYSADMIN
 - OBJMAINT
 - SECMAINT
 - AUDIT
- AUDIT, SECMAINT, OBJMAINT and SYSADMIN events occur infrequently enough they can generally always be audited
 - CHECKING and VALIDATE have a medium impact, audit failures
 - EXECUTE and CONTEXT have a high impact, need to be very targeted

Audit Recommendations

- Audit everything at the instance level
- Audit the database for AUDIT, SECMAINT, OBJMAINT, SYSADMIN
- Audit failures at the database for CHECKING, VALIDATE
- Audit admins for everything

Analyzing Audit Output

- Db2 writes to the active log file, which is then archived (copied)
- Only the instance owner should have read/write permissions on these files
 - Can contain SQL statements and input data, may be considered sensitive
- Output is in three formats:
 - text based report
 - CSV suitable for db2load
 - syslog
- Best practice is to analyze the output on a different system
 - Don't want admins able to hide their tracks by modifying the audit log in tables

Where to go next with audit

- Previous recommendations audit as much as possible without a large system impact
 - You may have additional goals requiring more auditing
- CHANGE HISTORY EVENT MONITOR can provide additional insight into database activities
- There is no guidance on analyzing audit output
 - 3rd party products such as IBM Guardium Data Protection for Databases can provide advanced tooling and analysis

Stay up to date with fixes!

- 60% of data breaches are the result of unpatched systems
- Any security related APAR is accompanied by a security bulletin
 - Describes at a very high level the impact of the vulnerability
 - Vague on purpose, keep details out of the hands of hackers
- See the [list of published security bulletins](#)
- Security fixes are published simultaneously across all supported releases as either fixpacks or special builds
- Subscribe to [My Notifications](#) to find out about new bulletins

Advanced Hardening Actions

- Db2 STIG
 - Security Technical Implementation Guides by DoD
- Centre for Internet Security Benchmark for Db2
 - Guidelines for securing a Db2 Server
 - Updates coming soon for V11.5
 - Community driven effort, feel free to participate!
- Both are a little old, but still provide good practical advice

- Guardium Vulnerability Assessment
 - Detect vulnerabilities and misconfigurations in your database server
 - Encodes rules from STIG and CIS guides

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